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REGIONAL IMPACT OF ZONING: A SUGGESTED APPROACH
Judicial consideration of the impact of zoning beyond local political
boundaries has been gaining gradual acceptance in the courts 1 and has
received the nearly unanimous approval of the commentators. 2 Given the
failure of effective legislative action to overcome the strictly local orientation of present zoning and planning law,3 and the rapidly growing process
of metropolitanization, 4 this development is not surprising. It is merely
the product of the realization that local political boundaries arbitrarily disrupt the market for land in a metropolis of interdependent communities.
This integration of the interests of the larger geographical area with traditional zoning analysis is, however, fraught with uncertainty. The constitutional standard for judicial review of a local zoning ordinance is that it
bear a reasonable relation to the public health, safety, morals or general
welfare.5 The precise manner in which regional interests are to be employed in the delineation of this standard is largely an open question.
Highlighting this problem is the recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court
case of National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn,6 affirming a lower court holding
that four-acre minimum lot size zoning in Easttown Township in suburban
Philadelphia was unconstitutional. In determining the constitutionality of
I See Flora Realty & Inv. Co. v. City of Ladue, 362 Mo. 1025, 246 S.W.2d 771
(1952) ; Duffcon Concrete Prods. Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N.J. 509, 64 A.2d
347 (1949); Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390
(1959) ; Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 566, 42 N.E.2d 516, 519 (1942)
(dictum) ; Fischer v. Bedminster Township, 11 N.J. 194, 203, 93 A.2d 378, 382 (1952)
(dictum); Levitt v. Village of Sands Point, 6 N.Y.2d 269, 160 N.E.2d 501, 189
N.Y.S.2d 212 (1959) (by implication).
2 See, e.g., Harr, Zoning for Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case,

66 HARv. L. REv. 1051 (1953); Note, 15 SYRAcusE L. REV. 507 (1964); Note, 71
YALE L.J. 720 (1962).
3A survey of attempts to provide regional solution to metropolitan planning problems is contained in Harr, Regionalism

U. PA. L. REv. 515 (1957).

and Realism in Land-Use Planning, 105

The author concludes that these attempts have been

politically infeasible and have resulted in largely advisory bodies lacking sufficient

enforcement powers.

The adoption of regional planning has been left to optional

cooperation between individual municipalities.

Id. at 520-23.

There exist, however,

two notable exceptions to this prevailing situation. One is the Hawaiian state plan-

ning commission, which provides a comprehensive state-wide plan for controlling land

use. This plan is binding upon the local communities whose local zoning powers are
carried out in accordance therewith. For a discussion of the Hawaiian situation, see
U.S. DEP'T OF AGRicuLTURE, A PLACE To LvE 499-508 (1963). The other exception
is the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto Act, 2 Eliz. 2, c. 73 (Ont. 1953), which
provides for a metropolitan "official plan" that prevails over local planning schemes.

For studies on the problems and accomplishments in Toronto, see generally Milner,
The Metropolitan Toronto Plan, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 570 (1957) ; Spelt, The Develop-

mnent of the Toronto Conurbation, 13

4 See

BUFFALO L. REV. 557 (1964).
GtJTKIND, THE TWILIGHT OF CITIEs (1962) ; HIGBEE, THE SQUEEZE: Crms

WrIHOUT SPACE 89-138 (1960).
5 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 373 (1926) ; Kinney
v. City of Joliet, 411 Ill. 289, 292, 103 N.E.2d 473, 475 (1952) ; Hoffman v. Kinealy,
389 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1965)..
6419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
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the zoning ordinance,7 the court made the typical inquiries into the alleged
justifications for the ordinances and the economic loss imposed upon the
protesting landowner.9 It also stressed, however, "the township's responsibility to those who do not yet live in the township but who are part, or
may become part, of the population expansion of the suburbs," concluding
that Easttown Township could not "stand in the way of the natural forces
which send our growing population into hitherto undeveloped areas in
search of a comfortable place to live." "I While this decision thus brings
Pennsylvania into accord with those jurisdictions ascribing weight to regional considerations, the case is cloudy on what role these considerations
play. This Comment attempts to formulate a basis for their recognition by
the courts and their optimal judicial implementation.
To some the Kohn decision represented a significant departure, 1 pos7
Much of the discussion in Kohn dealt with the procedural questions of exhaustion
of remedies, standing and proper parties. Id. at 508-18, 215 A.2d at 601-05. While
beyond the scope of this treatment, these questions pose several interesting problems.
See KRASNoWECKI, OWNERSHIP AND DEVELOPMENT OF LAND 521-26 (1965).
8 The ordinance was justified on the basis of (1) inadequate sewage, water and
traffic facilities, (2) preservation of historical sites and homes, (3) preservation of
the character of the neighborhood, and (4) preservation of open space. 419 Pa. at
524-30, 215 A.2d at 608-11. The first two were rejected for largely evidentiary reasons.
The third was the most important in the court's view, but was found insufficient to
justify the adverse impact of the zoning upon the demand for residential land. The
fourth was found to be an invalid objective of zoning, for if successful it would serve
to deprive the property owner of property without compensation. Success in maintaining the open space depended upon the landowner being unable to sell his land
because there was no market for it at four-acre minimums. This last point demonstrates the distinction between the police power and the power of eminent domain,
since the court recognized that eminent domain could have been invoked by the municipality to preserve open space. 419 Pa. at 529, 215 A.2d at 610-11.
9 The value of the land as it was previously zoned at a one-acre minimum lot size
was $260,000, and it was $175,000 at the present four-acre minimum. 419 Pa. at 524,
215 A.2d at 608. The constitutionality of the one-acre minimum in Easttown was
upheld in Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Board of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958),
where the court reversed on rehearing its earlier holding of unconstitutionality. For
a study of the Bilbar case before rehearing which agrees with the court's original
decision, see Comment, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 292 (1957).
Some state courts, through interpretation of state due process clauses, have
undercut the deference paid to state legislatures by the Supreme Court in the area

of economic due process.

See BARRETT,

BRUTON & HONNOLD,

CASES ON

CONSTrru-

962-63 (1963). In Pennsylvania, Art. 1, § 10 of the state constitution
provides in part:
• . . [P]rivate property [shall not] be taken or applied to public use, without
authority of law and without just compensation being first made or secured.
This clause has been interpreted similarly to the federal due process clause, in that
zoning is constitutional when necessary for the preservation of the public health,
safety, morals or general welfare. See Appeal of Lord, 368 Pa. 261, 81 A.2d 533
(1951). Thus, although the Kohn decision may not be justified under the fourteenth
amendment as presently interpreted, the state court could still rely upon the state
constitution to retain control over local zoning ordinances.
10 419 Pa. at 532, 215 A.2d at 612.
TIoNAL LAW

"1See note 12 infra; Philadelphia Bulletin, Nov. 11, 1965, p. 35, col. 1:
This is surely a landmark decision in the no-man's-land which separates
human and property rights. It is surely a new concept that suburban areas
must yield their way of life in response to population pressures from the city.
It would seem to say that if those who live in, and own, Easttown Township
do not wish it to become another King of Prussia, or another Upper Darby,
they are powerless to prevent it.
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sibly politically motivated,'1 2 from existing law. However, the sensitivity
expressed in Kohn for regional considerations has existed, in embryonic
form at least, as long as modern zoning law itself. In the landmark case
of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,13 the United States Supreme
Court, considering a comprehensive zoning ordinance which totally excluded industry from a Cleveland suburb, remarked:
[T]he village, though physically a suburb of Cleveland, is politically a separate municipality, with powers of its own and authority to govern itself as it sees fit within the limits of the organic
law of its creation and the State and Federal Constitutions ...
It is not meant by this, however, to exclude the possibility of cases
where the general public interest would so far outweigh the interest of the municipality that the municipality would not be allowed
to stand in the way.14
The Pennsylvania court, moreover, in a case upholding a one-acre minimum
ordinance in Easttown,' 5 declared that "minimum lot areas may not be
ordained so large as to be exclusionary in effect and, thereby, serve a
private rather than the public interest." 16
While the policy behind such statements may be appealing, their legal
basis is unclear. One looks with doubt upon the decisions of local bodies,
apt to be parochial or representative of vested interests, when these decisions affect outsiders adversely. The issue remains whether this doubt can
be translated into a foundation for legal action. Those outside the locality
have no direct means of redress, being forced to rely on whatever pressure
they can exert through the state legislature. 17 The prevailing state statutory framework discloses no basis upon which to consider the outsider.
Consideration of regional interests by local zoning authorities is not statutorily required. 18 This statutory framework follows the Standard State
Suburban & Wayne Times, Nov. 18, 1965, p. 2, cols. 1-2:
The [Kohn] court could have decided, on legal grounds, that Easttown
had unjustly zoned the property, but instead, issued a sociological ukase, following in the steps of the U.S. Supreme Court. As with the parent body, the
State Court has thumbed its nose at Constitutions while eyeing the political
returns.
12See

13 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
14Id. at 389-90.
15 Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Board of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958).
16 Id. at 75, 141 A.2d at 858.
17 That is, they do not vote at the local level, nor do they have standing to contest
legally the validity of the zoning. Rather, the representation of their interests must
await the legal action of a local landowner willing to sell and able to show economic
loss occasioned by the low density zoning.
18 The reference in Kohn, 419 Pa. at 531, 215 A.2d at 612, to PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 53, § 67003 (1957), which the court interprets to mean that area surrounding a
community is relevant to a consideration of the validity of a local ordinance, is misleading. The section refers to the "character of the district." (Emphasis added.)
The preceding section reads: "[T]he supervisors may divide the township into districts

....

"

Without further statutory clarification, it would seem that the

"district" referred to in both sections is the same, so that land use beyond the municipal
boundaries is not statutorily relevant to the cited section.
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Zoning Enabling Act, 19 which provides that a local legislature may zone
for the purpose, among others, "of promoting . . . the general welfare

of the community."

20

Yet one can argue that to be valid as a police regulation, the ordinance
must bear a reasonable relation to the "general welfare" of the State. Since
the relevant "general welfare" which limits exercise of the state police power
is the general welfare of the state, and since the state delegation of its
police power must be at least as limited as the power itself, then the local
exercise of the police power must be similarly limited. Thus, a local
exercise of the police power must bear a reasonable relation to the general
welfare of the state. It is not only permissible but necessary for a court
to go beyond the words of the enabling act and consider the elements
forming this broader general welfare. In this expanded sense, general
welfare would certainly encompass regional demand for high density land
2
and how it is affected by local ordinances. '
Perhaps the most persuasive argument for affording recognition of
regional interests is a negative one. The alternative of doing so would be
socially unrealistic and undesirable, and in the end self-defeating. That
rejection of regional interests as valid matters of judicial concern would be
self-defeating is demonstrated by the impact such treatment would have
upon market conditions. A stabilization of supply of subdivided land in
the face of a rising regional demand for such land would markedly increase
its price, creating an increasing differential between the price of the land
zoned at the low density and the price at a higher density. The economic
loss thus occasioned by the landowner would at some point become so
great that the courts would eventually be forced to retreat.2
Since regional
19 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STANDARD

STATE ZONING ENABLING

ACT (rev. ed.

1926).

20

Id. § 1. (Emphasis added) ; see, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 67001 (1957);
DaL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 301 (1953).
21 Buttressing this argument is the fact that the outsiders excluded by low density
zoning are denied access to political means of affecting change at the local level.
Consideration of non-local interests being constitutionally required, the situation is
somewhat analogous to federal cases prohibiting discriminatory restrictions on interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has stated that restrictions on interstate commerce principally affecting out of state residents are not subject to the usual political
influences which impinge upon the state legislative process. See, e.g., South Carolina
Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184 n.2 (1938). In the commerce
clause cases, outsiders have standing to contest the validity of the legislative action;
in the zoning area, those adversely affected must depend upon the local landowner
who is challenging the ordinance upon due process grounds to represent their interests.
This lack of standing, however, should not prevent the court from considering such
interests. Cf. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953).
A somewhat related argument to support the Kohn analysis is a broad construction
of the term "community" in the enabling act to include that potential future "community" which is adversely affected by the zoning. Compare the quote from Kohn
at note 10 supra.
22
It is assumed that the courts would implement this retreat through the "taking"
approach. When the economic loss suffered by the protesting land owner became
sufficiently great, the court would decide that the local zoning ordinance constituted
a "taking" and was therefore unconstitutional. This "taking" principle is the constitutional limit upon the exercise of the police power, and is to be distinguished from
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demand for local land would make itself felt eventually, the question becomes whether it is preferable to forego explicit consideration of the
regional situation, or to accept and build upon the rationale of Kohn.
There are two techniques through which a court could give tacit
effect to the regional interests producing increased demand. One approach
would be to constrict the limits of the "general welfare," by a per se
exclusion of zoning below a certain level of density.2 3 Under present law,

density zoning is supportable under the rubric of "maintaining the character of the neighborhood." 24 This approach essentially allows local
government to aid in the maintenance of both property values and the
aesthetic quality of local land. It is also arguable that density zoning is
justified under the section of the Zoning Enabling Act which provides that
the local body may zone to "provide adequate light and air; to prevent the
overcrowding of land; [and] to avoid undue concentration of population.
"2
This statutory argument, however, is not persuasive, for density
is not necessarily tied to population size, 28 and there are other means, such
as regulating the issuance of building permits, which are just as effective
and much more flexible. 2T In providing for "adequate light and air" there
is little to distinguish, for example, between four-acre and one-acre lots.
Thus in a case such as Kohn the municipality's best argument, and the one
which would have to be rejected by the court were it to adopt the per se
approach, is that based upon community interest in maintaining the "char28
acter of the neighborhood."
Rejection of considerations based upon maintenance of the character
of the neighborhood would be unfortunate. There is a "general welfare"
imbedded in maintaining the value of land at its present use and the appealing surroundings which have induced homeowners to settle in the community. Secondly, the point of per se invalidity is not likely to be at an
acreage less than one acre, after which a community's interest in density
control becomes considerably more important. This being so, the per se
approach does not answer what happens with density restrictions below
this point, as the demand for even higher density land increases. Morethe "just compensation" limitation upon the power of eminent domain. When a
taking is declared, the zoning authority may still employ the police power by rezoning,
or may proceed by means of eminent domain. See KRASNOWIECXI, op. cit. supra
note 7, at 479-82.
23 It is notable that the Kohn court explicitly rejected this treatment of the question. 419 Pa. at 523 n.22, 215 A.2d at 608 n.22.
24 See Fischer v. Bedminster Township, 11 N.J. 194, 205, 93 A.2d 378, 384 (1952);
Best v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 106, 117, 141 A.2d 606, 612 (1958) ; Bilbar
Constr. Co. v. Board of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 73, 141 A.2d 851, 857 (1958).
25 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING Acr § 3 (rev.

ed. 1926).
2
6 See Haar, supra note 2, at 1061.
27 See Comment, 106 U. PA. L. R1v. 292 n.5a (1957).
2
8 Itis assumed that there are no additional justifications for low density zoning
advanced by the municipality that are valid under the police power in the interests of
the- public health or safety. Should such justifications exist in any particular case,
an exception would have to be made along these lines to the per. se invalidity of the
minimum acreage.
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over, the presumptive approach provides no basis for distinguishing the
validity of density zoning which has an adverse impact upon outside interests from that which does not. Thus tacit recognition of regional demand
for local land through the per se approach would be an overreaction to
such demand.
There is another alternative to giving explicit effect to regional interests which affords a way to judge the validity of all densities and a partial
solution to the danger of overreaction. To distinguish between density zoning which is harmful and that which is not, the courts could measure its validity according to the economic loss suffered by the local landowner desiring
to sell. For each density differential, i.e., the differential between the present
and the landowner's proposed density, the court could recognize a degree
29
To
of economic loss at which the lower density would fall to the higher.
the extent that it accepts the validity of density zoning absent a certain
level of economic loss, this approach is inconsistent with the per se approach, which is unwilling to recognize the validity of density zoning
beyond a certain point. The fact that this economic differential approach
does not explicitly recognize regional demand for local land may not, however, affect the extent to which this approach gives vent to such demand.
Rather, this technique can easily give more importance to such demand
than is warranted. 30
The preferable approach is to weigh the local community's interest in
balanced growth, the maintenance of a desirable residential neighborhood
and the provision of adequate municipal facilities against the region's interest in higher density land. This can be attained by explicit consideration of
two factors which enter into determination of the regional impact of a
local zoning ordinance: the comprehensive planning scheme of the locality
and the planning of the other communities in the same regional area. These
two factors are crucial concerns of a court using a "regional" approach.
By considering them, a court can give weight to the good faith efforts of
a community to deal with regional problems. The validity of density zoning centers about its effect upon regional demand for higher density land.
If one community has opened its gates to this demand, while others similarly situated have not, the question arises whether in fact that community
is still exerting an adverse pressure upon the metropolitan area, or whether
that pressure is present, despite local efforts, because other communities
have refused to make any concession to regional interests. If it is the latter
situation, the local community which has partially accommodated the regional demand should not be made to bear the burden of metropolitan
expansion disproportionately.
2
The sustainable price 'differentials would most likely increase as the zoning
became less. restrictive. This is due to the obviously greater general welfare in preserving, for example, a one-half acre'rhinimum as opposed. to a one-quarter acre
minimum than in preserving a ten-acre minimum as opposed to a five-acre minimum.
-"
3o See text accompanying note 32 infra.
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As a further estimate of the degree to which local zoning is in fact
adversely affecting regional demand, a court may also look beyond local
boundaries to ascertain whether a demand for high density land is being
rationally focused on the best supply of such land. If a demand has irrationally chosen local restricted land over nonrestricted land elsewhere, 5 '
by this demand
the local community's planning scheme should not be upset
2
which can be satisfied elsewhere with no disturbance.3
Thus under the regional approach there will be four distinct situations
facing the court: (1) where the local zoning and the zoning of similarly
situated communities are the same with respect to the degree of accommodation of regional demand-here there is no reason for favoring the local
community, and if the demand is sufficient the low density should not be
sustained; (2) where the local community fails to show accommodation
of higher density interests comparable to that of other communities similarly situated-since the local zoning would fall in the preceding situation,
it would fall here a fortiori; (3) where the local community has accommodated higher density demand and other communities have not-here
the local zoning should be allowed to stand and the regional demand for
higher density land use be forced to look elsewhere; (4) where, aside from
considerations of the communities' relative accommodation of regional demand, local land is restricted and the high density land desired is available
elsewhere for development-in this case the restrictive local zoning should
be allowed to stand if the high density demand can be met by the available
supply, the use of which causes no disruption with local planning schemes.
As long as a court incorporates these regional considerations into its
review of a local zoning ordinance, it can otherwise depend upon the economic loss of the individual landowner, as in the economic differential
approach,3 to determine the point at which density zoning should be invalidated. Although it is obvious that the approach which includes these
additional regional considerations will be difficult to administer, the equitable treatment of local and regional interests it promotes is worth the
difficulty of application.
The discussion above, admittedly, has assumed a rather simple model
of the regional situation with respect to demand for residential land. It is
31 The land market is atypical in that it is not atomistic. The decision to develop
certain land often reflects considerations other than pure supply and demand: (1)
builders are often geared to production and marketing of only one type of housing,
for example, row homes, ranch homes, etc., and wish to construct the type of housing
with which they are most familiar-this factor may result in a proposed use for the
land by a developer having no relation to optimum land use and may result in the
developer inaccurately representing market influences; (2) "snob appeal," i.e., a desire
to settle in residential areas for socio-economic reasons, may inflate land prices; and
(3) the developer is limited to those parcels available for sale-the seller's reasons
for entering into the transaction may bear no relation to the present market price for

land. See
32

generally GRIGsBy, HousncG MARxETs AND PuBLIc PoLIcY

(1963).

Cf. Valley View Village,- Inc. v. Proffet, 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955), where
the court held that an ordinance creating a completely residential incorporated village
was not unconstitutional. when the village had looked to the urroufiding area and
found adequate provisions for non-residential uses.
38 See text accompanying note 29 supra.

1258

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.114:1251

dependent upon a network of communities at least somewhat similar in
their susceptibility to this demand, whereas in practice it may be extremely
difficult to compare local planning schemes with an eye to measuring their
relative accommodation of regional pressures. This analysis does not disregard, moreover, the danger of involving the court in issues which best
lend themselves to legislative treatment. 34
One example suffices to demonstrate the potential difficulties a court
might encounter under the regional approach. Suppose there is four-acre
zoning in Township A and one-acre zoning in neighboring Township B
which the developers have not developed. A developer challenges the
zoning in Township A and, when told of the one-acre zoning in the neighboring township, argues that the land zoned for one acre is totally unfit
for development. Here the court is faced with the possibility of cynical
resistance on the part of the neighboring community,3 5 and finds it necessary to determine the marketability of the alternative development sites.
The analogous situation is met when a community says that it has accommodated its share of regional demand for high density land, and the developer answers that the community must do more because the local land
in dispute is the only land which is fit for development at the proposed
density.
The necessity for making these complex planning determinations is
perhaps the most difficult aspect of the regional approach.36 Given the
advantages of this approach, the best solution is to devise a fair procedure
for the introduction of the relevant evidence. The community could be
made to assert as a defense its accommodation of regional demand or the
availability of unrestricted land outside its borders. Once these defenses
are introduced, the community should be given the burden of proof upon
the question of accommodation and the developer the burden of proof on
the showing that non-local unrestricted land is unfit for development. This
approach utilizes the greater planning experience and access to relevant
34 This is not to say, however, that merely because a subject might be better dealt
with by the legislature, a court should for that reason refuse to act on the matter

other than in accordance with clear precedent.

See

MISHKIN

& MoIs, ON LAW

CouRTs 116-24 (1965).
35 One rather extreme example would be a municipality that zoned its local swamp
or city dump for one-acre minimum residential housing to fulfill its "accommodation"
of regional demand for such land. A more realistic example would be a township
containing both four and one-acre zoning. The four-acre areas could be located
closest to available schools, transportation facilities, municipal utilities and the like,
while the one-acre areas would be so placed as to be economically infeasible for higher
density development.
30 See also Haar, Regionalism and Realism in Land-Use Planning, 105 U. PA.
IN

L. REv. 515, 530 (1957) :
The limitations of the adversary process and the specialization of courts
evoke serious doubts as to judicial competence in deciding the proper regional
allocation of land resources. Indeed, the court may find itself interjected into
the troubling and difficult aspects of metropolitan relations and becoming the
center of controversy between the white collar, upper-middle-class suburb and
the increasing minority group, lower-income people of the central city. For
serious racial and class cleavages are involved in the movement of slum.
dwellers to the suburban fringe.
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information which the local government possesses. 37 This information
will be necessary to demonstrate that the relative accommodation of neighboring municipalities is insufficient. When neither municipality's zoning
need fall, because one has made an apparent attempt to accommodate high
density land, the burden is placed on the developer to show that the ordinance is unreasonable.
Perhaps the inherent difficulty involved in considering the regional land
market will make the regional approach useful only in extreme cases. The
regional approach nonetheless offers a logical framework for the integration
of regional interests in a review of local restrictive zoning, without the
social and doctrinal disadvantages which other approaches would entail.
Those cases in which it could be employed would promote an equitable
weighing of local and regional interests.
It is also possible that the implementation of the regional approach by
the courts would encourage local communities to provide for rising demand for higher density land, in hope of thereby gaining the support of
the courts should their planning schemes be later challenged. This would be
a welcome result, for the planning function is by nature better suited to the
legislature. The necessity for the local community to look at the planning
schemes of other communities which are similarly situated, if it is to be
assured of a successful defense of its planning scheme in the face of rising
regional demand, may well induce closer cooperation between communities
toward a more rational division of land uses over a larger geographical
area. Moreover, court insistence upon the importance of regional interests might lessen local political resistance to land planning on a metropolitan level. 8 Such an effect is at least more likely than in the situation where
suburban communities, by restrictive zoning, can effectively isolate themselves from metropolitan pressure.
37 As to the availability of the zoning and planning schemes of municipalities,
see Pa. H. 1807, §§ 502, 608-09, Sess. of 1966, which would require the filing of such
information by municipalities with a county planning agency.
38 Suburban communities have traditionally been the most consistent opponents
of positive policy making at the metropolitan level. For a study of the reasons behind
traditional local resistance to policy planning on the metropolitan level, in the context of the Philadelphia metropolitan area, see WiLLiAms, SuBUPAN DnIE
cEs
AND METROPOLITAN PoLIcIEs 187-210 (1965).

